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INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY 
 
Abstract 
A broad literature has emerged over the past decades demonstrating that firms’ 
environmental strategies and practices are influenced by stakeholders and 
institutional pressures. Such findings are consistent with institutional sociology, 
which emphasizes the importance of regulatory, normative and cognitive factors 
in shaping firms’ decisions to adopt specific organizational practices, above and 
beyond their technical efficiency. Similarly, institutional theory emphasizes 
legitimation processes and the tendency for institutionalized organizational 
structures and procedures to be taken for granted, regardless of their efficiency 
implications. However, the institutional perspective does not address the 
fundamental issue of business strategy necessary to explain the persistence of 
substantially different strategies among firms that are subjected to comparable 
levels of institutional pressures. In this chapter, we present current research 
arguing that such firms adopt heterogeneous sets of environmental management 
practices despite facing common institutional pressures because organizational 




Why do some firms adopt environmental management strategies that go beyond 
regulatory compliance? A broad literature has emerged over the past decades demonstrating that 
firms’ environmental strategies and practices are influenced by external stakeholders and 
institutional pressures, including from regulators and competitors (Aragón-Correa, 1998; 
Christmann, 2000; Dean and Brown, 1995; Delmas, 2003; Hart, 1995; Nehrt, 1996; Nehrt, 1998; 
Russo and Fouts, 1997; Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998) and non-governmental organizations 
(Lawrence and Morell, 1995).  
Such findings are consistent with institutional sociology, which emphasizes the 
importance of regulatory, normative and cognitive factors in shaping firms’ decisions to adopt   3
specific organizational practices, above and beyond their technical efficiency (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Lounsbury, Fairclough and Lee, Chaper 9 this volume). Several authors have built 
on institutional theory to explain firm’s adoption of environmental strategies. Jennings & 
Zandbergen (1995) argue that because coercive forces—primarily in the form of regulations and 
regulatory enforcement—have been the main impetus of environmental management practices, 
firms throughout each industry have implemented similar practices. Delmas (2002) proposed an 
institutional perspective to analyze the factors that led companies in Europe and in the United 
States to adopt the ISO 14001 Environmental Management System (EMS) international standard. 
She described how the regulatory, normative, and cognitive aspects of the institutional 
environment within a specific country affect the costs and potential benefits of ISO 14001 
adoption, and how this which lead to different adoption rates across countries. Other researchers 
have explored how companies operating in different organizational fields are subject to different 
institutional pressures. 
However, the institutional perspective does not address the fundamental issue of business 
strategy: why do organizations subject to the same level of institutional pressure pursue different 
strategies? In other words, how might institutional forces lead to heterogeneity, rather than 
homogeneity, within an industry? Hoffman (2001) argues that while organizations do not simply 
react to the pressures dictated by the organizational field, they also do not act completely 
autonomously without the influence of external bounds. Institutional and organizational 
dynamics are tightly linked.  
Other research has analyzed how organizational characteristics affect firms’ adoption of 
“beyond compliance” strategies. These studies have examined the influence of organizational 
context and design (Ramus and Steger, 2000; Sharma, 2000; Sharma, Pablo, and Vredenburg, 
1999) and organizational learning (Marcus and Nichols, 1999). Others have focused on   4
individuals and managers, examining the role of leadership values (Egri and Herman, 2000), and 
managerial attitudes (Cordano and Frieze, 2000; Sharma, 2000; Sharma et al., 1999).  
While each study has provided a piece of the puzzle, there is still a lack of understanding 
of the conditions under which institutional pressures and organizational characteristics explain 
the adoption of beyond compliance strategies (see Figure 1 below). In this chapter, we first 
describe the empirical research that examines how pressures from constituents of firms’ 
institutional environments affect their adoption of environmental strategies (relationship #1 in 
Figure 1). We then review the research that examines the moderating role of organizational 
characteristics on this relationship (relationship #2 in Figure 1). Finally, we offer some directions 
for future research.  
****************** 




Firms can adopt various types of voluntary environmental strategies that seek to reduce 
the environmental impacts of operations beyond regulatory requirements. For example, firms can 
implement EMS elements by creating an environmental policy, developing a formal training 
program, or instigating routine environmental auditing (Delmas, 2000). In addition, management 
can choose to have the comprehensiveness of their EMS validated by a third party by seeking 
certification to the ISO 14001 Environmental Management System Standard (Toffel, 2000). 
Management can also convey the importance of environmental management by including it as a 
criterion in employee performance evaluations (Nelson, 2002). 
Companies can also seek to improve relations with regulators and signal a proactive 
environmental stance by participating in government or industry sponsored voluntary programs 
(Delmas and Terlaak, 2002; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Short and Toffel, 2010; Toffel   5
and Short, Forthcoming). Indeed, the US EPA, some industry associations, and several NGOs 
have recently created voluntary standards to provide incentives for firms to go beyond minimal 
regulatory requirements. For example, the US EPA has developed several voluntary agreements 
between governmental agencies and firms to encourage technological innovation or reduce 
pollution while providing relief from particular procedural requirements (Delmas and Terlaak, 
2001: 44). Industry programs include Responsible Care and Sustainable Slopes (King and Lenox, 
2000; Rivera and de Leon, 2003), and NGO programs include The Natural Step and the Global 
Reporting Initiative Guidelines (Bradbury and Clair, 1999; Hedberg and von Malmborg, 2003).  
Companies can also work directly with customers and suppliers to improve their 
environmental performance. Furthermore, they may engage in “systematic communication, 
consultation and collaboration with their key stakeholders...(and) host stakeholder forums and 
establish permanent stakeholder advisory panels at either the corporate level, the plant level, or 
to address a specific issue” (Nelson, 2002: 18) . 
INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES: INFLUENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES 
The new institutional perspective suggests that firms obtain legitimacy by conforming to 
the dominant practices within their institutional field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1992). 
An organizational field includes “those organizations that…constitute a recognized area of 
institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other 
organizations that produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148).  
Several scholars have argued that examining only institutional forces is not sufficient to 
explain divergent organizational change (D'Aunno, Succi, and Alexander, 2000; Kraatz and 
Zajac, 1996). Kraatz and Zajac (1996) investigated the effect of both the institutional and 
technical or market environment on organizational change and found pressures from the   6
technical environment to be an important driver of organizational change. D’Aunno, Succi and 
Alexander (2000: 700-1) argue that “both institutional and market forces are likely to affect 
divergent change to varying degrees in different organizational fields and, probably, in different 
historical periods. Moreover, institutional and market forces may interact in important ways to 
affect organizational change, and future research should aim to specify their roles more 
precisely.” This speaks to the need to define precisely the external forces that pressure firms to 
engage in organizational change.  
In this chapter, instead of characterizing market forces as being in opposition to 
institutional forces, we consider that institutional forces can bound and define rational argument 
and approaches (Fligstein, 1990). In this approach, we differentiate two main sets of constituents 
of the organizational field: market and non-market constituents (Baron, 1995) and argue that 
both may be subjected to institutional forces. In doing so, we build on Hoffman’s (2001) insight 
that buyers and other market actors are constituents within an organizational field. 
Firms engage with market constituents (e.g., customers, suppliers, competitors, 
shareholders) via economic transactions, whereas non-market constituents (e.g., regulators, 
environmental organizations) are interested in social, political, and legal issues (Baron, 1995; 
Baron, 2000). Non-market and market constituents frame environmental management issues 
differently (Hoffman and Ventresca, 1999). For example, market constituents tend to view 
environmental issues primarily within the rubric of business performance, focusing on their cost 
and efficiency implications. On the other hand, non-market constituents such as regulators and 
activist groups typically view environmental issues as negative externalities and often operate via 
the legal system and the mass media (e.g., as a court of public opinion).    7
In this section, we review the empirical evidence that various institutional actors have 
influenced organizations’ environmental practices, focusing on politicians, regulators, local 
communities, customers, competitors, and shareholders (owners).  
Pressures from Non-Market Constituents 
Political and regulatory pressures. Government is perhaps the most obvious 
institutional constituent that influences firms’ adoption of environmental practices. Legislation 
authorizes government agencies to promulgate and enforce regulations, a form of coercive 
power. Whereas political pressure refers to the level of political support for broader or more 
stringent laws and regulations, regulatory pressure represents the extent to which regulators 
threaten to or actually impede a company’s operations based on their environmental performance 
(Delmas and Toffel, 2004). 
Many researchers have focused on the influence of enforced legislation and regulations 
on firms’ environmental practices (Carraro, Katsoulacos, and Xepapadeas, 1996; Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho, 2010; Delmas, 2002; Majumdar and Marcus, 2001; Rugman and Verbeke, 
1998). One study found government regulations to be the most frequently cited source of 
pressure in the adoption of environmental management practices (Henriques and Sadorsky, 
1996a).  
Several studies have compared institutional environments across different countries, 
many of which demonstrated that more stringent regulatory environments were associated with 
higher levels of adoption of beyond compliance environmental practices. Christmann (2004) 
found that a positive relationship between managers’ perception of the stringency of 
governmental environmental regulation in the country in which they operated and the stringency 
of their company’s internal environmental policy. Governments have also played an important 
role in firms’ decision to adopt ISO 14001 (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Delmas, 2002).   8
Governments can signal their endorsement of ISO 14001 by, for example, enhancing the 
reputation of adopters. Governments can also facilitate adoption by reducing information and 
search costs by providing technical assistance to potential adopters. Regulatory pressure was also 
found to be an important driver of firms’ participation in government led voluntary programs 
(Delmas and Terlaak, 2002). Delmas and Terlaak argued that institutional environments that 
strengthen the regulator’s ability to credibly commit to the objectives of governmental programs 
were key to the implementation of the voluntary programs.  
Within individual countries, research has shown that government pressure, measured by 
environmental inspections or the threat of legal liabilities, has increased the adoption of 
voluntary environmental practices. For example, one study showed that companies facing a 
greater threat of legal liability adopted more environmental management practices  (Khanna and 
Anton, 2002a). Furthermore, the threat of liabilities in a firm’s industry, as well as regulations 
aimed at other industries, was shown to increase the likelihood a firm will publicly disclose 
environmental practices and strategies (Reid and Toffel, 2009). Firms were more likely to self-
disclose environmental regulatory compliance violations if they recently experienced an 
enforcement measure (like an inspection or being issued a violation) and if they received 
immunity from prosecution for self-disclosed violations (Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; Short and 
Toffel, 2008). There is also fairly consistent evidence across many national government 
voluntary programs that regulatory pressures were important in motivating participation (Delmas 
and Montes-Sancho, 2010; Delmas and Terlaak, 2001; Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett, 2000; 
Rivera and de Leon, 2004; Segerson and Miceli, 1998). In at least one instance, this relationship 
changed over time, as Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2010) found that regulatory pressure 
significantly influenced the participation of early adopters of the US Climate Challenge 
voluntary program but found no evidence that it influenced late adopters.    9
Community and environmental interest group pressures. Local communities can also 
impose coercive pressure on companies through their vote in local and national elections, via 
environmental activism within environmental non-government organizations (NGOs), and by 
filing citizen lawsuits. Several studies have found that company decisions to adopt 
environmental management practices are influenced by the desire to improve or maintain 
relations with their communities (Florida and Davison, 2001). Studies have found that pressure 
from community groups have influenced firms to adopt environmental plans (Henriques and 
Sadorsky, 1996a) and government-sponsored voluntary environmental programs (Darnall, 
Potoski, and Prakash, 2010). Another study based on a survey of ISO 14001 certified companies 
across 15 countries found that one of the strongest motivating factors to pursue certification was 
the desire to be a good neighbor (Raines, 2002).  
Some communities may be better able than others to encourage plants to adopt 
environmental practices. Communities with larger minority populations, lower incomes and less 
education had greater exposure to toxic emissions (Arora and Asundi, 1999; Brooks and Sethi, 
1997; Khanna and Vidovic, 2001). Communities with higher incomes, higher population density, 
and greater participation in environmental and conservation organizations had less exposure to 
toxic emissions (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006). One study found that adoption of a US EPA 
voluntary program was more likely in communities with higher median household income, 
suggesting that socioeconomic community characteristics could affect plants’ decisions to adopt 
environmental management practices (Khanna and Vidovic, 2001). Greater declines in toxic 
emissions have been observed among plants located in communities with higher voting rates 
(Hamilton, 1999) and in states with higher membership in environmental interest groups 
(Maxwell et al., 2000), both proxies for a community’s propensity for collective action.    10
There are many examples where companies have amended their environmental practices 
in response to environmental group pressures (Baron, 2003; Lawrence and Morell, 1995; Sharma 
and Henriques, 2005). For instance, after Mitsubishi Corporation was subject to a protracted 
consumer boycott led by the Rainforest Action Network (RAN), Mitsubishi announced it would 
no longer use old-growth forest products (World Rainforest Movement, 1998).  
Pressures from Market Constituents 
In addition to the non-market pressures described above, market pressures can also lead 
firms to adopt environmental management practices. Below, we review the literature that 
explores the influences of customers, industries, and shareholders. 
Customer pressures. Pressure from buyers is perhaps the primary mechanism through 
which quality management standards have diffused (Anderson, Daly, and Johnson, 1999), and 
has also played a significant role in motivating firms to adopt environmental practices (Delmas 
and Montiel, 2008). Several studies have found evidence that customer pressure has motivated 
firms to adopt environmental management practices, with one study noting customers’ influence 
was second only to that of government pressure (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996b). A recent 
empirical analysis found customer pressure to be an important determinant of the likelihood of 
adopting the ISO 14001 standard (Delmas and Toffel, 2008). Others have found that companies 
customize their response to customer demands depending on the types of information being 
requested. For example, firms facing customer demand for information on the sustainability of 
products improved input processes, whereas firms that faced customer demand for product 
certification embarked on more fundamental changes to their operations including improving 
environmental efficiency in product design and packaging (Sharma and Henriques, 2005). In 
addition, companies adopted more comprehensive environmental practices if they sold goods and 
services directly to consumers (Anton, Deltas, and Khanna, 2004; Khanna and Anton, 2002b).   11
This suggests that managers perceive retail consumers (as opposed to than commercial and 
industrial customers) as exerting more pressure on companies to adopt environmental 
management practices.  
Industry pressure. Industry pressure is another important market pressure. For example, 
multinationals are widely recognized as key agents in the diffusion of practices across national 
borders by transmitting organizational techniques to subsidiaries and other organizations in the 
host country (Arias and Guillen, 1998). Firms may also mimic practices that successful leading 
firms have adopted. In addition, firms respond to customer requirements. Industry trade 
associations are also a strong driver of firm environmental behavior (Christmann, 2004; Delmas 
and Montes-Sancho, 2010; King and Lenox, 2000; Lenox and Nash, 2003).  
Competitor pressure can also encourage the adoption of EMS (Bremmers et al., 2007). In 
the U.S. hazardous waste management industry, local competition increased compliance with 
environmental regulation, though the effect diminished in larger markets (Stafford, 2007). One 
study found that firms facing little competition were less likely than firms in more competitive 
markets to decrease their environmental impact (Darnall, 2009).  
Several studies have found that industry associations have motivated firms to adopt 
environmental management practices or participate in voluntary programs (Christmann, 2004; 
Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2010; Delmas and Terlaak, 2002; Gunningham, 1995; Lenox and 
Nash, 2003; Rivera and de Leon, 2004). The decisions of whether to pursue certification and 
which EMS standard to pursue (ISO 14001 or the European Union's Eco-Audit and Management 
Scheme) were found to be strongly influenced by pressure from industry associations as well as 
from regional chambers of commerce, suppliers, and regulators (Kollman and Prakash, 2002). 
Trade conferences and seminars, representing industry pressure, can also influence 
environmental aspects of procurement decisions (Sharma and Henriques, 2005). Market   12
concentration within an industry may also affect environmental management practices; firms 
with fewer competitors were found to be less likely to reduce their environmental impacts 
(Darnall, 2009). Trade associations also employ a variety of informal mechanisms to encourage 
compliance with their own program requirements (Lenox and Nash, 2003). Lenox and Nash 
(2003) describe how a number of trade associations convene meetings to share implementation 
experiences among members and how such meetings impose pressure on managers of firms that 
are falling behind. 
The creation of industry self-regulatory institutions often occurs as a result of an accident 
or controversy, as a way to proactively manage more stringent regulation that would be imposed 
as a result of the event. The Three Mile Island incident prompted industry executives to create 
the Institute of Nuclear Power Operation (Rees, 1994). The chemical industry’s Responsible 
Care program was borne out of a deadly accident in Bhopal, India (Gunningham, 1995). As a 
caveat, some industry-created self-regulatory programs attracted more heavily polluting firms, 
which can viewed as a form of adverse selection (Lenox and Nash, 2003).  
Industry groups have created other institutions such as the Global Climate Coalition in 
response to threats of environmental regulations. This group was financed by firms and trade 
groups in the oil, coal, and auto industries, among others, and campaigned against the idea that 
the release of greenhouse gases led to global climate change. Its public relations campaigns were 
sufficiently effective to stir public debate and likely delayed government action (Revkin, 2009).  
Firm characteristics vis-a-vis adoption of industry standards have also been investigated. 
Previous adoption of voluntary environmental standards, such as Responsible Care and ISO 
9000, spur diffusion of subsequent standards, like ISO 14001 (Delmas and Montiel, 2008). 
Larger companies and those with better-known brands and corporate names, more intensive   13
polluters, and companies in sectors with higher emissions were more likely to participate in the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association’s Responsible Care Program (King and Lenox, 2000). 
Shareholder pressures. Several studies have examined efforts of shareholders to 
influence the environmental management practices of firms. Institutional investor ownership, 
measured through public pension fund ownership, was found to positively affect corporate social 
performance (Chatterji and Listokin, 2009). While shareholder resolutions on environmental 
topics seldom attract enough votes to pass, Reid and Toffel (2009) found that the very presence 
of an environmental shareholder resolution (many of which called for greater transparency) 
being targeted at a firm subsequently led its management to become more transparent by publicly 
reporting its climate change strategy and greenhouse gas emissions. Such shareholder proposals 
not only had not a direct effect on the targeted company, but also a spillover effect on firms in 
the same industry as a targeted firm, who also became more transparent (Reid and Toffel, 2009).  
Many scholars have observed that shareholder resolutions prompt companies to change 
their environmental practices through private meetings between management and activists during 
which the companies agree to adopt some of the proposals’ specifications in exchange for the 
activists withdrawing their proposals (O'Rourke, 2003; Proffitt and Spicer, 2006; Rehbein, 
Waddock, and Graves, 2004). For example, Amoco resisted calls by nine religious groups that 
proposed a shareholder resolution that called for the company to adopt the Valdez Principles, but 
reached a negotiated settlement. In exchange for the withdrawal of the proposal, the company 
agreed to abide by one of the principles and to publish an environmental progress report 
(Hoffman, 1996). The company subsequently enacted several other management practices 
aligned with the Valdez Principles. One study found that this compromise between activists and 
management was strongly related to more robust (or thorough) disclosure of environmental 
practices (Marshall, Brown, and Plumlee, 2007).    14
Examining how companies respond to environmental ratings is another approach to 
discern the influence of investors on managerial behavior. Chatterji and Toffel (2010)  analyzed 
how firms’ responded to KLD’s corporate environmental ratings and found that firms that 
initially received poor ratings subsequently improved their environmental performance more 
than other firms (including firms that had more positive initial ratings and firms that were never 
rated). Such improvements were most substantial among poorly-rated firms that were able to 
make low-cost environmental improvements and that were in highly regulated industries 
(Chatterji and Toffel, 2010).  
Combined pressures. It is important to note that while we described the institutional 
pressures individually, several studies use a combination of these institutional pressures and 
compare the differential effects of these pressures or combine them through factor analyses 
(Delmas, 2001; Delmas and Toffel, 2008). Furthermore the interaction between these 
institutional pressures is likely to moderate their individual influence on company practices 
(Bansal and Clelland, 2004). For example, Bansal and Clelland provided insights about how 
competitors, regulators, and customers can influence investors’ assessments of firms’ 
environmental legitimacy (Bansal and Clelland, 2004). As another example, the pressure from 
environmental groups may encourage the formulation of more stringent regulations. This, in 
turn, can induce industry leaders to encourage laggard firms to adopt environmental practices. 
Similarly, following its chemical disaster in Bhopal in 1984, Union Carbide along with other 
large chemical companies faced mounting public pressure for more stringent safety and 
environmental regulations. In response, the chemical industry developed and promoted a set of 
environment, health and safety (EHS) management practices—the Responsible Care program—
to chemical industry associations in Canada and the United States (King and Lenox, 2000; 
Prakash, 2000).   15
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS MODERATING THE IMPACT OF 
INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES ON ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES 
Institutional theory has traditionally described how isomorphic institutional pressures 
lead to common organizational practices. In the traditions of this framework, persistent 
heterogeneity among various firms within the same industry might be attributed to differences in 
the  composition of their organizational fields. For example, firms located in different states 
would face different institutional pressures, which could result in dissimilar organizational 
practices. Differing levels of institutional pressure could also lead to heterogeneous activities 
during any specific period, but ultimately these are purported to result in common organizational 
structures and practices to ensure legitimacy. As a consequence, few have employed institutional 
theory to understand questions of strategy, which focus on persistent differences among 
organizations that share common organizational fields. We therefore need more informed 
theories about how and why organizations respond differently to institutional pressures. While 
scholars have made significant advances in analyzing how institutional pressures affect firms’ 
decisions to pursue ‘beyond compliance’ strategies, there remains very limited research about 
how organizational factors moderate these relationships. Levy and Rothenberg (2002) describe 
several mechanisms by which institutionalism can encourage heterogeneity. First, they argue that 
institutional forces are transformed as they permeate an organization’s boundaries because they 
are filtered and interpreted by managers according to the firm’s unique history and culture. 
Second, they describe how an institutional field may contain conflicting institutional pressures 
that require prioritization by managers. Third, they describe how multinational and diversified 
organizations operate within several institutional fields—both at the societal and organizational 
levels—which expose them to different sets of institutionalized practices and norms. In this 
section, we review the empirical research on the interaction between institutional pressures and   16
organizational characteristics. 
Organizational Functions  
One line of research examines how differences in organizational functions moderate how 
institutional pressures affect firms’ responses. Hoffman (2001) theorized that organizations 
channel institutional pressures to different subunits, which frame these pressures according to 
their typical functional routines. For example, legal departments interpret pressures in terms of 
risk and liability, public affairs does so in terms of company reputation, environmental affairs in 
terms of ecosystem damage and regulatory compliance, and sales departments in terms of 
potential lost revenues. Consequently, the pressure is managed according to the cultural frame of 
the unit that receives it: either as an issue of regulatory compliance, human resource 
management, operational efficiency, risk management, market demand, or social responsibility 
(Hoffman, 2001). Delmas and Toffel (2008) extend this to hypothesize and demonstrate that 
corporate assignments of responsibilities to specific departments lead firms to differ in their 
receptivity to pressures from various stakeholders. In their framework, pressures from external 
stakeholders are channeled to different organizational functions, which influence how they are 
received by facility managers. These differences in receptivity are critical because they, in turn, 
influence organizations’ responses in terms of adopting management practices. In other words, 
some organizations will allow pressures from stakeholders to permeate the organization. For 
example, firms with powerful legal departments will be more responsive to pressures from 
regulators while firms with powerful marketing departments will be more responsive to pressures 
from customers.  These functional departments influence managers’ sensitivity and responses to 
institutional pressures in the form of adopting different environmental management practices. 
Analyzing survey and archival data, Delmas and Toffel (2008) find that organizations that were 
more receptive to institutional pressure from market constituents (controlling for the amount of   17
pressure exerted) were more likely to adopt the ISO 14001 Environmental Management System 
Standard, and that organizations that were more receptive to institutional pressure from non-
market constituents (controlling for the amount of pressure exerted) were more likely to adopt 
government-initiated voluntary programs and less likely to adopt ISO 14001.  
Environmental Management Efficiency  
Chatterji and Toffel (2010) argue that firms facing lower-cost opportunities to improve 
their environmental performance are more likely to respond to stakeholder pressures that 
besmirch their reputation. They find that less eco-efficient firms (those with above-average 
pollution levels given their size and industry) were particularly likely to respond to poor 
environmental ratings from KLD, a major socially responsible investment rating agency, by 
improving their environmental performance. 
Buyer-Supplier Relations  
The relationship between firms and their customers also affects firms’ responses to 
customer pressure. Delmas and Montiel (2009) revealed the importance of buyer–supplier 
relationships to moderate firms’ responses to customer pressures to adopt ISO 14001. Examining 
ISO 14001 adoption by automotive suppliers, Delmas and Montiel (2009) found that adoption 
was more likely among suppliers that were younger, which used ISO 14001 certification to gain 
legitimacy and signal their environmental practices; suppliers that had highly specialized assets 
and were thus more dependent on their current customers; suppliers that were headquartered in 
Japan and thus had a greater need to reduce the information asymmetries arising from the 
physical and cultural distance to the U.S.; suppliers that reported to the US EPA’s Toxic Release 
Inventory and therefore received higher levels of public scrutiny of their environmental 
management practices (Delmas and Montiel, 2009). Firms were more likely to adopt ISO 14001 
if they were located far from their potential buyers (King, Lenox, and Terlaak, 2005) and   18
adopted more comprehensive environmental practices if they sold goods and services directly to 
consumers (Christmann and Taylor, 2001).  
Industry Characteristics  
Others have focused on industry characteristics as moderators of institutional pressures 
on firm behavior. Lyon and Maxwell (forthcoming) predict greater transparency among firms in 
industries that have socially or environmentally damaging impacts. Cho and Patten (2007) found 
that firms in environmentally sensitive industries were especially likely to respond to pressures 
for transparency by disclosing some forms of environmental information (e.g., expenditures on 
pollution control and abatement) in their annual reports (10-Ks) because such firms “face greater 
exposure to the public policy process than companies from non-environmentally sensitive 
industries.” In their analysis of corporate disclosure of climate change strategy and greenhouse 
gas emissions, Reid and Toffel (2009) found that firms targeted by environmental shareholder 
resolutions were more likely to disclose this information, and that this relationship was especially 
pronounced for firms in environmentally sensitive industries. They also found that firms in 
industries with more environmental shareholder resolutions (i.e., targeting their competitors) 
were also more likely to disclose this information, even when the focal firm had not itself been 
targeted. Similarly, Chatterji and Toffel (2010) find that firms in more intensively regulated 
industries are particularly likely to respond to poor environmental ratings by improving their 
environmental performance. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This chapter reviews the literature that describes how stakeholders including politicians, 
regulators, local communities, customers, competitors, and shareholders impose institutional 
pressures on firms and how these pressures influence firms to adopt beyond compliance   19
environmental strategies. In addition, this chapter reviews research that reveals how 
organizational factors moderate how managers perceive and act upon these pressures. These 
moderating factors, which can magnify or diminish the influence of institutional pressures, 
include organizational structure and functions, environmental management efficiency, buyer-
suppliers relations, and industry characteristics. This novel research stream contributes to 
institutional theory by exploring how institutional pressures interact with organizational 
characteristics in influencing managerial decisions in general, and environmental strategies in 
particular. 
We also believe that this novel approach can reveal conditions under which firms are 
more likely to resist institutional pressure. Most prior studies predict and show positive 
relationships between institutional pressures and the adoption of environmental strategies. In 
most cases, more pressure is associated with the adoption of more environmental management 
practices. However, incorporating moderating effects of firm characteristics in the model can 
yield substantial insights that can even inverse relationships. For example, Delmas and Toffel 
(2008) found that, controlling for the level of regulatory pressure, ISO 14001 was less likely to 
be adopted by organizations that had strong legal departments. This approach allows researchers 
to identify factors that enable firms to disregard or actively resist institutional pressures. 
Likewise, Delmas and Montiel (2009) analyzed the motivations for automotive suppliers to resist 
the mandate of the Big Three US automotive manufacturers to adopt ISO 14001 by 2003. They 
found that suppliers resisting adoption by the deadline tend to be older, smaller, and to produce 
less specialized products. In addition, many resistant firms were less visible to regulators and 
environmental NGOs because they were not required to report their emissions to the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Toxic Release Inventory (TRI).  
In seeking to understand the factors that contribute to corporate environmental strategy,   20
further studies have highlighted the importance of additional organizational characteristics, 
including firms’ capabilities, resources, and ownership structure (Darnall and Edwards, 2006; 
Sharma, 2000; Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998), board size (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002), 
corporate identity and managerial discretion (Sharma, 2000), the characteristics of individual 
managers (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Cordano and Frieze, 2000), and corporate culture (Jermier 
and Forbes, Chapter 11 this volume). Future research could investigate how characteristics 
moderate how firms perceive and thus upon institutional pressures. For example, future work 
might examine the extent to which managers’ personal characteristics and professional 
experiences influence their perception of particular institutional pressures. It seems feasible that 
a facility manager’s nationality could imbue similar cultural-based sensitivities to those we 
ascribed to the influence of the headquarters country. In addition, corporate marketing and legal 
affairs department managers’ prior experience with stakeholders (e.g., when these managers 
were employed at other firms) could influence their current sensitivity to institutional pressures. 
A richer understanding of such personal attributes would provide an important supplement to the 
organizational characteristics identified in this chapter. 
Further promising areas of research stem from considering the dynamics of the 
interactions between institutional pressures and organizational characteristics. Just as Delmas 
and Montes-Sancho (2010; 2011) found that institutional pressures exerted a more powerful 
influence on firms when particular environmental management practices were just emerging, 
future research could explore whether, how, and why the moderating role of organization 
characteristics change over time. An example of such a study might examine the factors that lead 
organizations’ perceptions of institutional pressures to change over time, such as accumulating 
positive experiences engaging with particular stakeholders or the shock of being targeted by 
regulators, community protests, or activist campaigns.   21
Exploring how organizational factors moderate firms’ responsiveness to institutional 
pressures represents an important opportunity to develop institutional theory while enhancing its 
ability to foster a better understanding of why companies pursue different environmental 
strategies and environmental management practices. 
REFERENCES 
Anderson, S. W., Daly, J. D., and Johnson, M. F. 1999. Why firms seek ISO 9000 certification: 
Regulatory compliance or competitive advantage? Production & Operations 
Management, 8(10): 28-43. 
Anton, W. R. Q., Deltas, G., and Khanna, M. 2004. Incentives for environmental self-regulation 
and implications for environmental performance. Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management, 48(1): 632-654. 
Aragón-Correa, J. A. 1998. Strategic proactivity and firm approach to the natural environment. 
Academy of Management Journal, 41: 556-567. 
Arias, M. E. and Guillen, M. F. 1998. The transfer of organizational management techniques. In 
J. L. Alvarez (Ed.), The Diffusion and Consumption of Business Knowledge: 110-137. 
London: Macmillan. 
Arora, A. and Asundi, J. 1999. Quality Certification and the Economics of Contract Software 
Development: A Study of the Indian Software Industry (NBER Working Paper 7260). 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Bansal, P. and Roth, K. 2000. Why companies go green: A model of ecological responsiveness. 
Academy of Management Journal, 43(4): 717-736. 
Baron, D. P. 1995. Integrated strategy: Market and nonmarket components. California 
Management Review, 37(2): 47-65. 
Baron, D. P. 2000. Business and Its Environment, 3rd edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall. 
Baron, D. P. 2003. Private politics. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 12(1): 31-66. 
Bradbury, H. and Clair, J. A. 1999. Promoting sustainable organizations with Sweden's natural 
step. Academy of Management Executive, 13(4): 63-74. 
Bremmers, H., Omta, O., Kemp, R., and Haverkamp, D.-J. 2007. Do stakeholder groups 
influence environmental management system development in the Dutch agri-food sector? 
Business Strategy and the Environment, 16: 214-231. 
Brooks, N. and Sethi, R. 1997. The distribution of pollution: Community characteristics and 
exposure to air toxics. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 32(2): 
233-250. 
Carraro, C., Katsoulacos, Y., and Xepapadeas, A. (Eds.). 1996. Environmental Policy and 
Market Structure. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Chatterji, A. and Listokin, S. 2009. The economic and institutional motivations for corporate 
social responsibility, Working Paper, Duke Fuqua School of Business. 
Chatterji, A. K. and Toffel, M. W. 2010. How firms respond to being rated. Strategic 
Management Journal, 31(9): 917-945.   22
Cho, C. H. and Patten, D. M. 2007. The role of environmental disclosures as tools of legitimacy: 
A research note. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32(7-8): 639-647. 
Christmann, P. 2000. Effects of best practices of environmental management on cost advantage: 
The role of complementary assets. Academy of Management Journal, 43: 663-680. 
Christmann, P. and Taylor, G. 2001. Globalization and the environment: Determinants of firm 
self-regulation in China. Journal of International Business Studies, 32(3): 439-458. 
Christmann, P. 2004. Multinational companies and the environment: Determinants of global 
environmental policy standardization. Academy of Management Journal, 47(5): 747-760. 
Cordano, M. and Frieze, I. H. 2000. Pollution reduction preferences of US environmental 
managers: Applying Ajzen's theory of planned behavior. Academy of Management 
Journal, 43(1): 627-641. 
D'Aunno, T., Succi, M., and Alexander, J. A. 2000. The role of institutional and market forces in 
divergent organizational change. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(4): 679-703. 
Darnall, N. and Edwards, D. J. 2006. Predicting the cost of environmental management system 
adoption: The role of capabilities, resources, and ownership structure. Strategic 
Management Journal, 27(4): 301-320. 
Darnall, N. 2009. Regulatory stringency, green production offsets, and organizations' financial 
performance. Public Administration Review, May/June: 418-434. 
Darnall, N., Potoski, M., and Prakash, A. 2010. Sponsorship matters: Assessing business 
participation in government- and industry-sponsored voluntary environmental programs. 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 20(2): 283-307. 
Dean, T. J. and Brown, R. L. 1995. Pollution regulation as a barrier to new firm entry: initial 
evidence and implications for future research. Academy of Management Journal, 38: 288-
303. 
Delmas, M. 2001. Stakeholders and competitive advantage: The case of ISO 14001. Production 
and Operations Management, 10(3): 343-358. 
Delmas, M. and Terlaak, A. 2001. A framework for analyzing environmental voluntary 
agreements. California Management Review, 43(3): 44-63. 
Delmas, M. and Terlaak, A. 2002. Regulatory commitment to negotiated agreements: Evidence 
from the United States, Germany, The Netherlands, and France. Journal of Comparative 
Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 4: 5-29. 
Delmas, M. 2003. In Search of ISO: An institutional perspective on the adoption of international 
management standards. Stanford, CA: Stanford Graduate School of Business Working 
Paper 1784. 
Delmas, M. and Toffel, M. W. 2004. Stakeholders and environmental management practices: An 
institutional framework. Business Strategy and the Environment, 13(4): 209-222. 
Delmas, M. and Montiel, I. 2008. The diffusion of voluntary international management 
standards: Responsible Care, ISO 9000, and ISO 14001 in the chemical industry. The 
Policy Studies Journal, 36(1): 65-93. 
Delmas, M. and Montiel, I. 2009. Greening the supply chain: When are customer pressures 
effective. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 18(1): 171-201. 
Delmas, M. and Montes-Sancho, M. 2010. Voluntary agreements to improve environmental 
quality: Symbolic and substantive cooperation. Strategic Management Journal, 31(6): 
576-601. 
Delmas, M. and Montes-Sancho, M. 2011. An institutional perspective on the diffusion of 
international management system standards: The case of the environmental management 
standard ISO 14001. Business Ethics Quarterly, 21(1): 1052-1081.   23
Delmas, M. A. 2000. Barriers and incentives to the adoption of ISO 14001 by firms in the United 
States. Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum, 11(1): 1-38. 
Delmas, M. A. 2002. The diffusion of environmental management standards in Europe and the 
United States: An institutional perspective. Policy Sciences, 35: 91-119. 
Delmas, M. A. and Toffel, M. W. 2008. Organizational responses to environmental demands: 
Opening the black box. Strategic Management Journal 29(10): 1027-1055. 
DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W. W. 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2): 147-
160. 
Egri, C. and Herman, S. 2000. Leadership in the North American environmental sector: Values, 
leadership styles and contexts of environmental leaders and their organizations. Academy 
of Management Journal, 43: 571-604. 
Fligstein, N. 1990. The Transformation of Corporate Control. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Florida, R. and Davison, D. 2001. Gaining from green management: Environmental management 
systems inside and outside the factory. California Management Review, 43(3): 64-84. 
Gunningham, N. 1995. Environment, self-regulation, and the chemical industry: Assessing 
Responsible Care. Law & Policy, 17(1): 57-109. 
Hamilton, J. T. 1999. Exercising property rights to pollute: Do cancer risks and politics affect 
plant emission reductions? Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 18(2): 105-124. 
Hart, S. L. 1995. A natural-resource-based view of the firm. The Academy of Management 
Review., 20(4): 986-1014. 
Hedberg, C.-J. and von Malmborg, F. 2003. The Global Reporting Initiative and corporate 
sustainability reporting in Swedish companies. Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Management, 10(3): 153-164. 
Henriques, I. and Sadorsky, P. 1996a. The determinants of an environmentally responsive firm: 
An empirical approach. Journal of Environmental Economics & Management, 30(3): 
381-395. 
Henriques, I. and Sadorsky, P. 1996b. The determinants of an environmentally responsive firm: 
an empirical approach. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30(3): 
381-395. 
Hoffman, A. and Ventresca, M. 1999. The institutional framing of policy debates. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 42(8): 1368-1392. 
Hoffman, A. J. 1996. Trends in corporate environmentalism: The chemical and petroleum 
industries, 1960-1993. Society and Natural Resources, 9(1): 47-64. 
Hoffman, A. J. 2001. Linking organizational and field-level analyses: The diffusion of corporate 
environmental practice. Organization & Environment, 14(2): 133-156. 
Jennings, P. D. and Zandbergen, P. A. 1995. Ecologically sustainable organizations: An 
institutional approach. Academy of Management Review, 20(4): 1015-1052. 
Jermier, J and Forbes, L. 2011.  Greening organizational culture. In A. J. Hoffman & T. Bansal 
(Eds). Oxford Handbook of Business and the Environment. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
Kassinis, G. and Vafeas, N. 2002. Corporate boards and outside stakeholders as determinants of 
environmental litigation. Strategic Management Journal, 23(5): 399-415. 
Kassinis, G. and Vafeas, N. 2006. Stakeholder pressures and environmental performance. 
Academy of Management Journal, 49(1): 145-159. 
Khanna, M. and Anton, W. Q. 2002a. Corporate environmental management: Regulatory and 
market-based pressures. Land Economics, 78(4).   24
Khanna, M. and Anton, W. R. Q. 2002b. Corporate environmental management: Regulatory and 
market-based incentives. Land Economics, 78(4): 539-558. 
Khanna, N. and Vidovic, M. 2001. Facility Participation in Voluntary Pollution Prevention 
Programs and the Role of Community Characteristics: Evidence From the 33/50 
Program. Binghamton University Economics Department Working Paper. 
King, A. A. and Lenox, M. J. 2000. Industry self-regulation without sanctions: The chemical 
industry's Responsible Care program. Academy of Management Journal, 43(4): 698-716. 
King, A. A., Lenox, M. J., and Terlaak, A. 2005. Strategic use of decentralized institutions: 
Exploring certification with the ISO 14001 management standard. Academy of 
Management Journal, 48(6): 1091-1106. 
Kollman, K. and Prakash, A. 2002. EMS-based environmental regimes as club goods: 
Examining variations in firm-level adoption of ISO 14001 and EMAS in U.K., U.S. and 
Germany. Policy Sciences, 35: 43-67. 
Kraatz, M. S. and Zajac, E. J. 1996. Exploring the limits of the new institutionalism: The causes 
and consequences of illegitimate organizational change. American Sociological Review, 
61(5): 812-836. 
Laplante, B. and Rilstone, P. 1996. Environmental inspections and emissions of the pulp and 
paper industry in Quebec. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 31(1): 
19-36. 
Lawrence, A. T. and Morell, D. 1995. Leading-edge environmental management: Motivation, 
opportunity, resources and processes. In D. Collins & M. Starik (Eds.), Special Research 
Volume of Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, Sustaining the Natural 
Environment: Empirical Studies on the Interface Between Nature and Organizations: 99-
126. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Lenox, M. J. and Nash, J. 2003. Industry self-regulation and adverse selection: A comparison 
across four trade association programs. Business Strategy and the Environment, 12: 343-
356. 
Levy, D. L. and Rothenberg, S. 2002. Heterogeneity and change in environmental strategy: 
Technological and political responses to climate change in the global automobile 
industry. In A. J. Hoffman & M. J. Ventresca (Eds.), Organizations, Policy and the 
Natural Environment: Institutional and Strategic Perspectives. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Lounsbury, M.,Fairclough, S and Lee, M-D P. 2011. Institutional dynamics. In A. J. Hoffman & 
T. Bansal (Eds). Oxford Handbook of Business and the Environment. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
Lyon, T. P. and Maxwell, J. W. Forthcoming. Greenwash: Corporate environmental disclosure 
under threat of audit. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 
Majumdar, S. K. and Marcus, A. A. 2001. Rules versus discretion: The productivity 
consequences of flexible regulation. Academy of Management Journal, 44(1): 170-179. 
Marcus, A. A. and Nichols, M. L. 1999. On the edge: heeding the warnings of unusual events. 
Organization Science, 10: 482-499. 
Marshall, R. S., Brown, D., and Plumlee, M. 2007. 'Negotiated' transparency? Corporate 
citizenship engagement and environmental disclosure. Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 
28: 43-60. 
Maxwell, J. W., Lyon, T. P., and Hackett, S. C. 2000. Self-regulation and social welfare: The 
political economy of corporate environmentalism. Journal of Law and Economics, 43(2): 
583-619.   25
Nehrt, C. 1996. Timing and Intensity Effects of Environmental Investments. Strategic 
Management Journal, 17: 535-547. 
Nehrt, C. 1998. Maintainability of first mover advantages when environmental regulations differ 
between countries. Academy of Management Review, 23: 77-97. 
Nelson, J. 2002. From the margins to the mainstream: Corporate social responsibility in the 
global economy. In N. Højensgård & A. Wahlberg (Eds.), Campaign report on European 
CSR excellence 2002-2003: It simply works better!: 14-19. Copenhagen: The 
Copenhagen Centre, CSR Europe and the International Business Leaders' Forum. 
O'Rourke, A. 2003. A new politics of engagement: Shareholder activism for corporate social 
responsibility. Business Strategy and the Environment, 12(4): 227-239. 
Prakash, A. 2000. Greening the firm: The politics of corporate environmentalism. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Proffitt, W. T. and Spicer, A. 2006. Shaping the shareholder activism agenda: institutional 
investors and global social issues. Strategic Organization, 4(2): 165-190. 
Raines, S. S. 2002. Implementing ISO 14001—An international survey assessing the benefits of 
certification. Corporate Environmental Strategy, 9(4): 418-426. 
Ramus, C. A. and Steger, U. 2000. The roles of supervisory support behaviors and environmental 
policy in employee "ecoinitiatives" at leading-edge European companies. Academy of 
Management Journal, 43(4): 605-626. 
Rees, J. V. 1994. Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three 
Mile Island. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Rehbein, K., Waddock, S., and Graves, S. 2004. Understanding shareholder activism: Which 
corporations are targeted? Business and Society, 43(3): 239-267. 
Reid, E. M. and Toffel, M. W. 2009. Responding to public and private politics: Corporate 
disclosure of climate change strategies. Strategic Management Journal, 30(11): 1157-
1178. 
Revkin, A. C. 2009. On climate issue, industry ignored its scientists, The New York Times. New 
York. 
Rivera, J. and de Leon, P. 2003. Voluntary environmental performance of western ski areas: Are 
participants of the Sustainable Slopes Program greener? Paper presented at the Annual 
Research Conference of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, 
Washington DC. 
Rivera, J. and de Leon, P. 2004. Is greener whiter? The Sustainable Slopes Program and the 
voluntary environmental performance of western ski areas. Policy Studies Journal, 32(3). 
Rugman, A. M. and Verbeke, A. 1998. Corporate strategies and environmental regulations: An 
organizing framework. Strategic Management Journal, 19(4): 363-375. 
Russo, M. V. and Fouts, P. A. 1997. A resource-based perspective on corporate environmental 
performance and profitability. Academy of Management Journal, 40: 534-559. 
Scott, W. R. 1992. Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems, 3rd ed. . Englewood 
Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
Segerson, K. and Miceli, T. J. 1998. Voluntary environmental agreements: Good or bad news for 
environmental protection? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 36: 
109-130. 
Sharma, S. and Vredenburg, H. 1998. Proactive corporate environmental strategy and the 
development of competitively valuable organizational capabilities. Strategic Management 
Journal, 19: 729-753.   26
Sharma, S., Pablo, A. L., and Vredenburg, H. 1999. Corporate environmental responsiveness 
strategies: The importance of issue interpretation and organizational context. Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science, 35(1): 87-108. 
Sharma, S. 2000. Managerial interpretations and organizational context as predictors of corporate 
choice of environmental strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 43: 681-697. 
Sharma, S. and Henriques, I. 2005. Stakeholder influences on sustainability practices in the 
Canadian forest products industry. Strategic Management Journal, 26: 159-180. 
Short, J. L. and Toffel, M. W. 2008. Coerced confessions: Self-policing in the shadow of the 
regulator. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 24(1): 45-71. 
Short, J. L. and Toffel, M. W. 2010. Making self-regulation more than merely symbolic: The 
critical role of the legal environment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(3). 
Stafford, S. L. 2007. Should you turn yourself in? The consequences of environmental self-
policing. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 26(2): 305-326. 
Toffel, M. 2000. Anticipating greener supply chain demands: One Singapore company's journey 
to ISO 14001. In R. Hillary (Ed.), ISO 14001: Case Studies and Practical Experiences. 
Sheffield, UK: Greenleaf Publishing. 
Toffel, M. W. and Short, J. L. Forthcoming. Coming clean and cleaning up: Does voluntary self-
reporting indicate effective self-policing? Journal of Law & Economics. 
World Rainforest Movement. 1998. End of boycott: "Eco-Agreement" between RAN and 






















































Magali A. Delmas is a Professor of Management at the UCLA Anderson School of 
Management and the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability. She has written more than 
50 articles, book chapters and case studies on business and the natural environment. Her current 
work includes the analysis of the effectiveness of firms’ voluntary environmental initiatives.  
 
Michael W. Toffel is an Associate Professor at Harvard Business School, and has a PhD 
in Business Administration from the University of California at Berkeley. His research 
investigates the determinants and efficacy of tactics and strategies companies adopt to reduce the 
environmental impact of their operations and supply chains. 
 
 